Household Formation, Female Labor Supply, and Savings

AuthorHans Fehr,Fabian Kindermann,Manuel Kallweit
Published date01 October 2016
Date01 October 2016
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12154
Scand. J. of Economics 118(4), 868–911, 2016
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12154
Household Formation, Female Labor
Supply, and Savings
Hans Fehr
University of Wuerzburg, DE-97070 Wuerzburg, Germany
hans.fehr@uni-wuerzburg.de
Manuel Kallweit
German Council of Economic Experts, DE-65180 Wiesbaden, Germany
manuel.kallweit@svr-wirtschaft.de
Fabian Kindermann
University of Bonn, DE-53113 Bonn, Germany
fabian.kindermann@uni-bonn.de
Abstract
In this paper, we aim to quantify the impact of changing family structures on labor supply and
savings in Western societies. Our dynamic general equilibrium model features both genders,
and it takes into account changes in marital status as a stochastic process. The numerical
results indicate that changes in household formation can partly explain the reallocation of
male and female labor supply observed during the last decades in Germany. We also find a
negative impact on capital accumulation, and we show that a combination of higher marital
risk and a narrowing gender wage gap can explain the changes in hours ratios between single
and married men and women.
Keywords: Home production; life-cycle model; marital risk; stochastic general equilibrium
JEL classification:J12; J22
I. Introduction
Almost all Western societies are currently experiencing an unprecedented
two-dimensional demographic transition. On the one hand, low fertility and
reduced mortality rates change the age structure of the population. On the
other hand, declining marriage and increasing divorce rates radically alter
the traditional family structure within cohorts. While numerous studies
We are grateful for helpful comments from Karl Ove Aarbu, Johann Brunner, Alexia
F¨
urnkranz-Prskawetz, Alfred Maussner, Lex Meijdam, two anonymous referees, and seminar
participants at the universities of Augsburg and Lund, DIW Berlin, NETSPAR Pension
Workshop, CESifo Munich, and the annual congresses of the German Economic Association
and ESPE. Financial support from NETSPAR and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung is gratefully
acknowledged.
CThe editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015.
H. Fehr, M. Kallweit, and F. Kindermann 869
have already evaluated the economic consequences of an aging population,
much less research has focused on the impact of the changing household
structure for various economic aggregates. Changes in the number of
couples and singles in an economy will alter the respective income
distribution as well as the structure of tax payments and public transfers.
In addition, precautionary behavior will be adjusted, as families offer an
(incomplete) insurance contract against lifespan (Kotlikoff and Spivak,
1981) and income risk (Attanasio et al., 2005; Halla and Scharler, 2012).
Consequently, the actual and the perceived future household structure will
affect life-cycle labor supply, consumption, and savings behavior, which in
turn might have severe effects on labor and capital markets.
In the present study, we attempt to quantify such macroeconomic
repercussions of the changing family structure. Therefore, we develop a
two-gender life-cycle family model with endogenous labor supply, which
accounts for income and lifespan uncertainty, and distinguishes between
market work and home production. Throughout their life cycle, individuals
are exposed to the (exogenous) risk of getting married and divorced. When
being single, individuals choose consumption, labor supply in the market,
the production of home goods, and savings. When married, two partners
have to decide about whether and how to make use of specialization within
the household.
We calibrate our model to the German economy, which has experienced
a transformation of household structures in the last decades that is typi-
cal for Western societies. In order to so, we use macroeconomic statistics
as well as microeconomic data on time use and labor productivity. Our
analysis then proceeds in three distinct steps. First, we identify the driving
forces that determine behavioral differences between married and single
men and women. Second, we quantify the impact of a change in marriage
and divorce probabilities on both individual behavior and the macroecon-
omy. Therefore, we run the model with two sets of probabilities: one set is
derived from the marital and divorce behavior observed in 1970, and the
other from current behavior. Third, in order to put our results into perspec-
tive, we use our model to clarify the effects of changes in the gender wage
gap during the same period on different types of households.
Our quantitative results indicate that differences in eduction and wages
between men and women as well as the fact that married partners can
make use of joint filing in the tax system are the major determinants of
specialization within the marriage. We also find that differences in life
expectancy mainly explain the disparities in savings behavior of men and
women.
When we alter marriage and divorce probabilities, macroeconomic ag-
gregates are affected by both a compositional and a behavioral effect.
Because married women work less than single women, aggregate female
CThe editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015.
870 Household formation, female labor supply, and savings
labor supply increases when the share of married couples in the population
declines. The same argument applies to the labor supply of men, but vice
versa. As married couples have a higher savings rate, capital accumulation
is negatively affected by the changes in household structure. In terms of
individual behavior, we f ind that changes in marital risk have an impact
on the life-cycle labor supply and savings profiles of singles, while labor
supply of married couples is almost unaltered. This finding is related to the
implicit insurance provision of the family. In a marriage, partners can adapt
their labor supply and home production effort so as to absorb idiosyncratic
productivity shocks that are uncorrelated between the two spouses. Be-
neath this implicit insurance against labor market uncertainty, inheritances
from one partner to the other provide insurance against longevity risk. If
marriage becomes less likely, single individuals anticipate the loss of this
implicit insurance mechanism. As a consequence, they increase their labor
supply in the market at early stages in life to build up precautionary sav-
ings. However, in turn they decrease their labor supply towards the end of
the working life, and start to live off their savings earlier, so that labor
supply effects are mostly inter-temporal. In total, the change in marital and
divorce risk therefore comes along with an increase in aggregate female
labor supply and a decline in male labor supply. In terms of asset accumu-
lation, the negative compositional effect is almost washed out by the strong
increase in single individuals’ savings, so that aggregate savings decline
only slightly.
What the change in marital risk does not explain are the empirically
observed changes in hours ratios between men and women. Our simulations
reveal that these changes can mostly be attributed to the narrowing of the
gender wage gap between 1970 and 2010. Interestingly, our model is able
to capture the empirical fact that the hours ratio between married and
single women has significantly increased over the last decades, meaning
that the change in the gender wage gap had a much stronger impact on
married women’s labor supply than on single women. The reason for this
asymmetry is that a narrowing gender wage gap crowds out specialization
within the family, and increases the ability of women to participate in risk
sharing (see Heathcote et al., 2010).
Our approach is related to several strands of the recent literature using
calibrated models. First, it builds on Rogerson (2009) and Olovsson (2009),
who analyze labor supply issues in models with home production. Second,
it is linked to the large body of literature that tries to explain the long-run
changes in labor supply of married women (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2005;
Olivetti, 2006; Attanasio et al., 2008; Kaygusuz, 2010; Guner et al., 2012).
Finally, it is connected to family models (e.g., Caucutt et al., 2002; Chade
and Ventura, 2002; Greenwood and Guner, 2009), which either deal with
marriage issues or concentrate on the relationship between fertility and
CThe editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015.

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