On the Effects of Suggested Prices in Gasoline Markets

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12289
Published date01 April 2019
AuthorRiemer P. Faber,Maarten C. W. Janssen
Date01 April 2019
Scand. J. of Economics 121(2), 676–705, 2019
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12289
On the Effects of Suggested Prices in
Gasoline Markets*
Riemer P. Faber
Charles River Associates, London EC2M 7EA, UK
rfaber@crai.com
Maarten C. W. Janssen
University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna,Austria
maarten.janssen@univie.ac.at
Abstract
There is a widespread suspicion that suggested prices act as a focal point for individual firms
when setting their prices. Oil companies announce suggested prices for gasoline stations in the
Dutch retail market. Weshow that, compared to the gasoline spot market price, suggested prices
contain additional information that explains retail price changes. We conclude that suggested
prices have a horizontal coordinating effectin the sense that retail prices react to infor mation that
suggested prices contain and that is unrelated to firms’ costs (i.e., the information that firms use
under normal competitive conditions).
Keywords: Coordination; gasoline markets; price setting; suggested prices
JEL classification:L11; L42; L81
I. Introduction
The boundary between price setting under normal competitive conditions
and price coordination is often not clear. This issue is particularly prominent
regarding the interpretation of suggested prices (Buehler and G¨artner, 2013;
Lubensky, 2017). Suggested prices are prices that are announced with the
recommendation for firms to follow them. Suggested prices are not binding
in any legal way, and firms are free to deviate and charge higher or lower
prices as they wish.
There is a widespread suspicion that suggested prices distort the
normal functioning of markets as they may act as a focal point (e.g.,
*We thank Rikkert Nachtegaal for help with data collection. We thank Christiaan Heij, Heleen
Hofmans, Emiel Maasland, Dirk van den Berg, Dick van Dijk, and the anonymous referees for
helpful comments. Maarten Janssen acknowledges financial support from the Austrian Science
Fund FWF, under project number P 27995-G27.The views expressed are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of Charles RiverAssociates.
Also affiliated with the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and CEPR.
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The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2018.
R. P. Faber and M. C. W. Janssen 677
uhn, 2001; Motta, 2004; Buccirossi, 2008). A suggested price stands out
among all possible prices that a firm can choose and therefore relatively
many firms may choose it. As a result, suggested prices may have a
coordinating effect on prices set by individual firms. The evidence for this
hypothesis is either anecdotal or experimental (e.g., Holt, 1995; Cason,
2008).1
In this paper, we empirically study the effects of suggested prices, using
data from the Dutch gasoline market.2In many countries, such as the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Spain, and Italy, large oil companies
provide stations that use their brand with a suggested price for gasoline
on a daily basis.3Often these oil companies are both wholesalers and
retailers as they own a substantial number of the stations that use their
brand.
Despite the little empirical evidence on the effects of suggested prices,
there are quite a few cases where different competition authorities have
argued that by setting suggested prices, firms or professional organizations
have violated competition law. For example, the Dutch competition authority
(ACM) decided that several professional organizations for psychologists and
psychiatrists were guilty of violating competition law as they advised their
members via their website how much to charge per hour given the costs
members typically would encounter.4What, according to the organizations,
was meant as an aid to their members, was judged by the ACM as a way to
coordinate pricing decisions of individual entrepreneurs above competitive
levels. The ACM argued that suggested prices helped to considerably
reduce the uncertainty concerning competitors’ price-setting behavior.5A
1Knittel and Stango (2003) quantify the impact of focal points on price setting via a study on
government-imposed nonbinding price ceilings in the US credit card market. See also Albæk
et al. (1997), Marshall et al. (2008), and Sen et al. (2011).
2Foros and Steen (2013b) is the closest to our paper and below we extensively discuss the
differences and similarities with that study. De los Santos et al. (2013) study the effects of
suggested prices in South Korean retail markets. Other empirical studies that use suggested
prices include Gripsrud (1982), Hofstetter and Tovar (2010), and Foros and Steen (2013a).
3Oil companies often also publish their suggested price on their websites (e.g., BP in the
Netherlands, Statoil in Norway and Sweden, and OMV in Austria). The Spanish government
prohibited suggested prices for gasoline in 2013 and oil companies in Italy stopped publishing
suggested prices after an investigation of the competition authority (CNC, 2012; Bolet´ınOficial
del Estado, No. 47, Sec. I, p. 15226, 2013; AGCM press releases 5/2007 and 92/2007).
4See ACM (formerly NMa) decision case 3309/NIP, LVE, NVP, and NVVP, 2004. The court of
appeal canceled the decision on the basis that it was not clear that the price was a decisivefactor
in the decision process of consumers while choosing a psychologist (CBb, decision case AWB
06/667, ECLI:NL:CBB:2008:BF8820, 2008).
5TheACM reiterated its concerns in a case involving nonbinding public announcements of future
price strategies of telecom firms (decision case 13.0612.53, 2014).
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The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2018.

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