Framing and Misperception in Public Good Experiments

• Author: Erik Wengström,Lars Gårn Hansen,Toke Reinholt Fosgaard
• Date: 01 April 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12165
• Published date: 01 April 2017

Scand. J. of Economics 119(2), 435–456, 2017

DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12165

Framing and Misperception in Public

Good Experiments∗

Toke Reinholt Fosgaard

University of Copenhagen, DK-1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark

tf@ifro.ku.dk

Lars G˚

arn Hansen

University of Copenhagen, DK-1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark

lgh@ifro.ku.dk

Erik Wengstr¨

om†

Lund University, SE-220 07 Lund, Sweden

erik.wengstrom@nek.lu.se

Abstract

Earlier studies have found that framing has a substantial impact on the degree of coopera-

tion observed in public good experiments. We show that the way the public good game is

framed affects misperceptions about the incentives of the game. Moreover, we show that such

framing-induced differences in misperceptions are linked to the framing effect on subjects’

cooperation behavior. When we do not control for the different levels of misperceptions

between frames, we observe a significant framing effect on subjects’ cooperation prefer-

ences. However, this framing effect becomes insignificant once we remove subjects who

misperceive.

Keywords: Cooperation; experiment; framing; heterogeneous sample; misperception; social

dilemma

JEL classification:C90; D03; H41

I. Introduction

A large number of studies have demonstrated that the way a decision is pre-

sented can have a considerable impact on people’s behavior. For example,

there is ample evidence from social dilemma experiments that behavior

∗We gratefully acknowledge the generous funding provided by the Carlsberg Foundation.

E. Wengstr¨

om is also grateful for support from the Wallander–Hedelius Foundation. We

are deeply grateful to Jean-Robert Tyran for initiating and administrating the large-scale

experiment that this paper builds on. A special thanks goes also to Eva Gregersen for

research assistance.

†E. Wengstr¨

om is also affiliated with the University of Copenhagen.

CThe editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015.

436 Framing and misperception in public good experiments

differs depending on whether the choice situation is framed as “taking

from” a common pool or as “giving to” a common pool (e.g., Andreoni,

1995a; McCusker and Carnevale, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998; van Dijk

and Wilke, 2000; Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al., 2011; Dufwenberg et al., 2011;

Cubitt et al., 2011; Cappelen et al., 2013; Dreber et al., 2013; Messer

et al., 2013; Zhang and Ortmann, 2014). Several potential explanations

have been put forth. Some authors interpret framing effects as manifesta-

tions of frame-dependent preferences (McCusker and Carnevale, 1995; van

Dijk and Wilke, 2000; Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al., 2011), some find shifts in

subjects’ beliefs to be an important explanation (Sonnemans et al., 1998;

Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012), while others again sug-

gest that differences in induced self-control could be important (Martinsson

et al., 2012a, 2012b; Kocher et al., 2013).

Another possible explanation for framing effects has been suggested by

K¨

oszegi and Rabin (2008, p. 1829) who write: “Framing and focusing ef-

fects can be interpreted in two ways. Under one interpretation, the frame

or focus of an individual affects her preferences, and these preferences

are translated into frame-sensitive choices. In the alternative view, prefer-

ences do not depend on the momentary frame or focus, but some decision

situations lead people to make mistakes in implementing their stable prefer-

ence.” If subjects find it more difficult to understand the decision problem

in one frame, then the framing effect might be explained by more sub-

jects making mistakes about their optimal behavior in that frame. Thus,

if framing does affect the degree of misperception, it could potentially

explain part of the framing effect that has been attributed to shifts in pref-

erences and beliefs in other studies. Such a relationship between framing

and misperceptions seems important to explore given that several studies

have already found that misperception is connected to cooperative behavior

(Andreoni, 1995b; Houser and Kurzban, 2002; Ferraro and Vossler, 2010;

Bayer et al., 2013).

Our main research objectives are to test whether the degree of

misperception is affected by how the game is framed, and whether

such differences in misperception can explain framing effects on co-

operation. To achieve these aims, we run a large-scale public good

(PG) experiment with the well-established give and take framings

of the PG game. Our experiment separates preferences and beliefs

about other subjects’ contributions, and misperceptions. This is achieved

by eliciting conditional PG contribution profiles through the strategy

method (Fischbacher et al., 2001), thereby controlling for beliefs about

the contributions of other group members. To measure the degree

of misperception, we use incentivized ex-post questions. Subjects are

asked to fill in the conditional contribution profile that would have

CThe editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015.