A Characteristics Approach to Optimal Taxation: Line Drawing and Tax‐Driven Product Innovation

Published date01 April 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12174
Date01 April 2017
Scand. J. of Economics 119(2), 240–267, 2017
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12174
A Characteristics Approach to Optimal
Taxation: Line Drawing and Tax-Driven
Product Innovation
Christian Gillitzer
Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney NSW 2000, Australia
gillitzerc@rba.gov.au
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK
h.j.kleven@lse.ac.uk
Joel Slemrod
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
jslemrod@umich.edu
Abstract
Real-world tax legislation assigns goods to different categories of tax rates on the basis of
observable characteristics, allowing the tax system to handle a constantly evolving set of
available goods. We recast the theory of optimal taxation in the language of characteristics,
and we show how to optimally draw lines that delineate tax-rate regimes. Such lines are
associated with notches in tax liability as a function of characteristics, creating incentives
to introduce goods with new combinations of characteristics in order to reduce tax liability.
With a restricted set of tax instruments, such notches are in general part of the second-best
optimal tax system.
Keywords: Notches; tax design
JEL classification:H21
I. Introduction
Optimal tax theory in general prescribes different tax rates on each com-
modity, but in practice consumption tax systems feature a small number
of distinct rates. A non-capricious commodity tax system must have pro-
cedures for distinguishing among goods subject to the different tax rates.
Real-world tax systems do that by appealing to the characteristics of the
We thank Alan Auerbach, Tim Besley, Robin Boadway, Peter Fredriksson, Louis Kaplow,
Wojciech Kopczuk, Dan Shaviro, David Weisbach, Shlomo Yitzhaki, and anonymous referees
for helpful comments. We also thank Yulia Paramonova for valuable research assistance. C.
Gillitzer adds the disclaimer that the opinions expressed should not be attributed to the
Reserve Bank of Australia.
CThe editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015.
C. Gillitzer, H. J. Kleven, and J. Slemrod 241
commodities. For example, US states retail sales taxes often exempt food
purchases but not restaurant meals, requiring the tax code to draw a line
between the two categories. This is done by appealing to a set of char-
acteristics of a restaurant meal, and the line can be fine – such as when
grocery stores sell pre-prepared meals that might or might not be eaten
on the premises, or when stores set up in-store salad bars. The retail sales
tax in the Canadian province of Ontario exempts basic food items such
as flour but applies to other processed foods such as chocolate bars. This
requires lines to be drawn, including one that subjects to tax biscuits or
wafers specifically packaged and marketed to compete with chocolate bars.
Several European countries provide a subsidy for certain kinds of consumer
services (e.g., cleaning, gardening, and house repair) based on a Ramsey-
type justification that such services compete with untaxed home production.
This requires the classification of services eligible for the subsidy based
on observable characteristics.
Although line drawing is a ubiquitous issue in real-world tax systems and
a pervasive point of contention among tax lawyers, there is little economic
analysis of the issue. We note that a “line” shares many attributes of a
“notch” in tax schedules, which refers to a discontinuity in the function of
how tax liability relates to the tax base, and which has attracted much recent
attention among economists as a means of identifying behavioral response
elasticities (e.g., Kleven and Waseem, 2013). Indeed, a line creates a notch
in characteristics space, because the tax liability changes discontinuously
when the characteristics vector of a good crosses the statutory line. As
long as a continuum of tax rates is administratively infeasible, notches
in characteristic space are an unavoidable feature of tax systems, not an
idiosyncrasy.
The prominent role of characteristics in commodity tax systems is the
result of several factors. First, using observable characteristics is a natural
and intuitive way to distinguish among different goods, or different groups
of goods, and to assign them to tax-rate categories. The alternative that
the theory of optimal commodity taxation implies (i.e., classifying goods
according to compensated elasticities) is infeasible, both because these elas-
ticities are notoriously difficult to estimate precisely and because this type
of rule would not be intuitive to policymakers, voters, or consumers in
the way that characteristics-based rules are. Second, a shared characteristic
plausibly signals something about the relative substitutability of the goods,
and so it might serve as a more readily measurable indicator of the ideal,
but not observable, determinants of the appropriate tax rate.1Third, mod-
ern economies produce a vast amount of different goods, and the set of
1Kleven and Slemrod (2009) address this problem with a completely distinct modeling
approach. They formalize the relationship between characteristics, substitutability, and optimal
CThe editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015.

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